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Comment
Recent Developments in Behavior
Modification
There are many varieties of "behavior modification" and many different
formulations, but they all agree on the essential point: behavior can be
changed by changing the conditions of which it is a function.1
-B.F. Skinner
I. INTRODUCTION
Behavior modification traditionally has been defined as "the
systematic application of proven principles of conditioning and
learning in the remediation of human problems." 2 To more fully
understand this definition, it is best to begin by examining some of
the recognized psychological principles of conditioning and learn-
ing. Although there are many learning theory modes upon which
behavior modification techniques may be based, the three major
modes are modeling, classical conditioning, and operant condition-
ing.3
The modeling mode is based on observation. In theory, the
probability of a subject demonstrating a particular behavior will be
increased if the subject observes that behavior in another person.
For example, a child is more likely to enjoy playing the piano if she
observes her parent happily playing the piano.
In classical conditioning, an unconditioned stimulus which au-
tomatically elicits a particular behavior is frequently paired with a
conditioned stimulus which does not automatically elicit that re-
sponse. After one or more pairings, the conditioned stimulus alone
will elicit the same response. For example, when the Russian
physiologist Ivan Pavlov paired meat powder (unconditioned stim-
1. B.F. SKINNER, BEYOND FREEDOM AND DIGNITY 150 (1971).
2. Milan & McKee, BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION: PRINcIPLEs AND APPUCATIONS IN
CoRREcTIoNs (Oct. 1973), reprinted in STAFF OF SUBcoumxL ON CONSTITU-
TIONAL RIGHTS, SENATE COMm. ON THE JUDicIARY, 93D CONG., 2D SEss., INDIVID-
UAL RiGHTS AND THE FEDERAL RuLE IN BEHAVIOR MODIFIcATION 459,461
(Comm. Print 1974) [Hereinafter cited as THE FEDERAL ROLE]. For an in
depth discussion of the psychological principles involved in behavior modifi-
cation, see, e.g., A. BANDURA, PRINcIPLEs OF BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION (1969);
G. MARTIN & J. PEAR, BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION: WHAT IT Is AND How TO Do IT
(1978).
3. See generally sources cited note 2 s-upra.
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ulus) with the sound of a metronome (conditioned stimulus), dogs
were eventually conditioned to salivate solely upon hearing the
metronome.4
The third and most frequently used mode of behavior modifica-
tion is operant conditioning. In operant conditioning, behavior re-
sponses are learned or unlearned as a function of their
consequences. Unlike classical conditioning, these responses are
not automatically elicited, but, rather, are voluntarily emitted by
the person.5 Under this learning theory mode, the three main con-
sequences or contingencies of behavior are reinforcement (re-
ward), punishment, and extinction. Reinforcers may be primary
(food, water, sex) or secondary (praise, gold stars, money).6 When
a reinforcer is a consequence of specific behavior, that behavior is
more likely to occur again in the future. For instance, when a child
opens a cookie jar and finds cookies, he is more likely to open it
again in the future because he was rewarded the first time. When
punishment follows a particular behavior, that behavior is less
likely to occur again. For instance, when the child opens a cookie
jar and finds a snake inside, he is less likely to open it again in the
future. Extinction occurs when a reinforcement is withheld from a
response resulting in a decrease of repeated behavior. In the
above example, if the child opens up a cookie jar and finds no cook-
ies, he is less likely to open the jar in the future.7
Prior to the middle of the 1970s, little had been written on the
constitutionality of using certain behavior modification techniques
on institutionalized persons.8 In 1976, one article stated,
"[biecause new cases are continuously being litigated, the
juridicial information provided in this paper will soon need to be
updated."9 Therefore, the purpose of this comment is to bring the
evolving "law of behavior modification" up-to-date by an examina-
tion of recently decided federal opinions.10
This comment will explore recent developments in the law con-
4. See generally sources cited note 2 supra.
5. See generally sources cited note 2 supra.
6. See notes 157-58 & accompanying text infra.
7. Whitman, Behavior Modification: Introduction and Implications, 24 DEPAUL
L. REV. 949, 954-56 (1975).
8. The culmination of these legal and psychological writings are included in a
bibliography found at 13 Am. CrM. L. REV. 101 (1975).
9. Budd & Baer, Behavior Modification and the Law: Implications of Recent Ju-
dicial Decisions, 4 J. PsYCH. & L. 171, 173 (1976).
10. For an informative source for the federal government's role in behavior modi-
fication up to 1974, see THE FEDERAL RoLE, supra note 2.
For a discussion of the legal trends in the law of behavior modification up
to 1975, see generally R. MARTiN, LEGAL CHALLENGES TO BEHAVIOR MODIFICA-
TION (1975). The author summarizes some of the earlier cases having implica-
tions for the application of behavior modification techniques. Id. at 169-79.
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cerning certain behavior modification practices in mental health
and penal institutions. The practices which will be explored in-
clude the use of drugs, seclusion, physical restraints, token econo-
mies, therapeutic labor, psychosurgery, and electric shock. With
the exception of psychosurgery, which is included here because it
too causes behavior changes, all these practices may be used con-
tingently as reinforcements or punishments to modify behavior in
mental patients, prison inmates, or school children. Discussed
herein are the constitutional limitations of these behavior modifi-
cation techniques as they have evolved in recent years.
II. DRUGS
In the broadest sense, it might be said that behavior modifica-
tion occurs whenever drugs are administered to a person for the
purpose of changing the subject's behavior. Television commer-
cials tell us that as a consequence of taking aspirin, we are less
tense and irritable. The psychologist, however, would limit the
scope of behavior modification by use of drugs to those situations
where a drug is administered contingently for a desired re-
sponse." For example, a prison inmate might have a bad habit of
dumping his food tray on the floor. Each time this contingency oc-
curs, the warden might respond by injecting the inmate with a
drug designed to induce vomiting. In time, the inmate will refrain
from engaging in such behavior for fear of further injections. It is
obvious that the use of such aversive reaction drugs can be very
effective in modifying certain types of behavior.12 But the use of
drugs for such a purpose has been severely curtailed in light of
various constitutional considerations identified in recent federal
court cases. In the following review of cases, it should be under-
stood that the holdings and standards set forth presumably apply
to the use of drugs whether or not they are used contingently for
behavior modification purposes.
A. First and Eighth Amendments
One of the first cases to have implications for the relatively re-
cent legal awareness of behavior modification was Winters v.
Miller.13 Winters held that a physician, by forcing medication on a
practicing Christian Scientist who had been admitted involuntarily
11. See Budd & Baer, supra note 9, at 222.
12. Whether or not used contingently, drugs are widely used for treating undesir-
able behavior in institutionalized persons. See, e.g., Bomstein, The Forcible
Administration of Drugs to Prisoners and Mental Patients, 9 CLEARINGHOUSE
REV. 379, 379-80 (1975); Comment, Forced Drug Medication of Involuntarily
Committed Mental Patients, 20 ST. Louis U. L.J. 100, 112 (1975).
13. 446 F.2d 65, 67 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 985 (1971).
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
to the hospital, had violated the patient's first amendment right of
religious freedom. The Court recognized a valid claim for damages
under section 1983,14 in part because no court had ever found the
plaintiff to be mentally incompetent (although she was probably
mentally ill).15 The court found no evidence that medication given
against plaintiff's continued objection would advance any social in-
terest. Without an overriding secular interest, such as the state
interest in public health and welfare,16 the court would not allow
any infringement upon the free exercise of the plaintiffs religion.'7
In addition to these first amendment considerations, it has also
been held that the compulsory use of tranquilizers on inmates and
mental patients may violate the eighth amendment's prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment. For example, the Seventh
Circuit has held that the staff at a boys training school could not
give juveniles tranquilizers intramuscularly without first attempt-
ing treatment methods other than drugs, and obtaining proper
medical supervision and prescription.18 In a prior case the Sev-
enth Circuit had also affirmed that tranquilizing drugs could not be
given to juvenile delinquents "for purposes of mere control or pun-
ishment."' 9 Similarly, a federal district court held, in part, that re-
tarded residents of a state mental hospital could not be given
excessive amounts of tranquilizers when administered for behavi-
14. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
15. 446 F.2d at 68. It is the law in New York that a mentally ill person who has not
been judicially declared incompetent may sue or be sued in the same manner
as any competent person. See, e.g., Sengstack v. Sengstack, 4 N.Y.2d 502, 151
N.E.2d 887, 176 N.Y.S.2d 337 (1958). Elsewhere, it is well settled that the law
will presume every person to be fully competent until sufficient proof to the
contrary is shown. See, e.g., Simmons First Nat'l Bank v. Luzader, 246 Ark.
302, 438 S.W.2d 25 (1969); In re MacCrellish, 167 CaL 711, 141 P. 257 (1914);
Walton v. Malcolm, 264 Ill. 389, 106 N.E. 211 (1914); Speer v. Speer, 146 Iowa 6,
123 N.W. 176 (1909); Rose v. Rose, 298 Ky. 404, 182 S.W.2d 977 (1944); First
Christian Church v. McReynolds, 194 Or. 68, 241 P.2d 135 (1952).
16. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905), wherein the Supreme
Court held that compulsory vaccinations to prevent the spread of smallpox
were permissible because they were based on a health interest sufficient to
override free exercise of religion.
17. 466 F.2d at 68-70.
18. Nelson v. Heyne, 491 F.2d 352, 357 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974).
In support of the argument that the use of tranquilizing drugs is punishment,
the Nelson court heard expert testimony that tranquilizers administered in-
tramuscularly to the juveniles could cause "the collapse of the cardiovascular
system, the closing of a patient's throat with consequent asphysixation, a de-
pressant effect on the production of bone marrow, jaundice from an affected
liver, and drowsiness, hemotological disorders, sore throat and ocular
changes." 491 F.2d at 357.
19. Wilson v. Coughlin, 472 F.2d 100, 102 (7th Cir. 1973).
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orial control, rather than for therapy.20 In finding that the resi-
dents' rights under the eighth and fourteenth amendments were
violated, the court suggested that insufficient staffing and self-pro-
tection of residents are impermissable reasons for the excessive
use of tranquilizers.21
B. Constitutional Guidelines
Constitutional standards for the use of drugs in mental institu-
tions were developed by the federal district court in Wyatt v.
Stickney, 22 which, apparently, were intended to apply whether or
not drugs are used contingently for behavior modification. The
standards that indicate: (1) Patients have a right to avoid un-
needed or excessive medication; (2) medication cannot be given
without the written order of a physician who shall not prescribe
medication for more than thirty days at a time; (3) the delivery of
each dosage must be recorded, and in the case of the mentally re-
tarded, the effects of medication and any behaviorial changes shall
be recorded; and (4) the physician must review each patient's drug
regimen weekly. The court also stated that "[m] edication shall not
be used as punishment, for the convenience of staff, as a substitute
for program, or in quantities that interfere with the patient's treat-
ment program".23 An apparent inconsistency exists in this state-
ment because a "patient's treatment program" may include the
use of behavior modification as "punishment."24 Although this
conflict remains unresolved, the court's language suggests that the
Wyatt standard forbids, without consent, the use of drugs as a be-
havior modification punishment in a mental patient's treatment
program.
In 1973, the Eighth Circuit developed guidelines for drug use
within penal institutions. In Knecht v. Gillman,25 mentally ill pris-
oners sought to enjoin the staff of an Iowa institution from inject-
ing prisoners with the drug apomorphine. The apomorphine,
which induces vomiting for up to an hour,26 was given for such mi-
nor infractions as oversleeping, talking, swearing, lying, and for
passing out cigarettes against orders. The Eighth Circuit held that
20. Welsch v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487, 503 (D. Minn. 1974), affid in part and va-
cated in part, 550 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1977).
21. Id.
22. 344 F. Supp. 373, 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972), afd sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503
F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
23. 344 F. Supp. at 380, 400.
24. See generally Burns, Behavior Modification as a Punishment, 22 Am J. JuRis.
19 (1977).
25. 488 F.2d 1136 (8th Cir. 1973).
26. Temporary cardiovascular effects also were manifested by changes in the
heart and blood pressure. Id. at 1137.
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the use of apomorphine on nonconsenting inmates as an aversive
behavior modification technique constituted cruel and unusual
punishment.27 The court's guidelines allowed apomorphine to be
administered only if: (1) the inmate gives informed written con-
sent2 8 which is certified by the physician; (2) the inmate has an
opportunity to revoke consent at any time; and (3) the drug is au-
thorized by a physician and administered by the physician or a
nurse only for modifying individual behavior actually observed by
one of the professional staff.2 9
More recently, federal court decisions have refined the analysis
of the permissible constitutional uses of drugs in penal or mental
institutions and have recognized new constitutional questions.
The most important and most pervasive result has been the recog-
nition of the right to privacy 3O as the foundation for an inmate's or
a mental patient's right to refuse medication.
Several of the new developments arose in Pena v. New York
State Division for Youth,31 a civil rights class action brought on
behalf of boys housed within New York's Goshen Annex. Specifi-
cally, the plaintiffs, relying on the eighth and fourteenth amend-
ments, challenged the use of thorazine and other tranquilizers to
control excited behavior. The court appeared shocked to find that
the staff at Goshen used thorazine as a punitive device when Go-
shen's regulations prohibited such drug use unless "no other
means of restraint can prevent the child from harming himself."32
The district court granted an injunction against the present
27. Id. at 1140. See also Mackey v. Procunier, 477 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1973), wherein
a state prisoner brought a civil rights action alleging that a California medical
facility's experimental use of the drug succinycholine without his consent
constituted cruel and unusual punishment. The drug is characterized by its
paralyzing effect which inhibits breathing. The court held that unconsented
experimentation with the drug "raise [sI serious constitutional questions re-
specting cruel and unusual punishment or impermissible tinkering with the
mental processes." Id. at 878.
28. The ability of an institutionalized subject to freely give informed consent to
behavior therapy is questioned in Davison & Stuart, Behavior Therapy and
Civil Liberties, 30 J. AM. PsYcH. 755, 762 (1975). For a complete discussion of
the subject of informed consent, see Barnhart, Pinkerton & Roth, Informed
Consent to Organic Behavior Control, 17 SANTA CLARA L REV. 39 (1977).
29. 488 F.2d at 1140-41.
30. For a background to the legal development of the right to privacy concept, see
A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM (1967); Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of
Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421 (1980); Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L REV. 383 (1960);
Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L REV. 193 (1890); Annot.,
43 L. Ed.2d 871 (1976 & Supp. 1980). In Nebraska, see Comment, The Right to
Privacy in Nebraska, 13 CREIGHTON L REV. 935 (1980); Note, Tort Recovery for
Invasion of Privacy, 59 NEB. L REv. 808 (1980).
31. 419 F. Supp. 203 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
32. Id. at 210 (italics omitted).
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method of drug administration, and established three guidelines,
primarily medical in nature, for future drug procedure at Go-
shen.33 First, thorazine may be used only as a part of an ongoing
treatment plan approved and supervised by a physician.34 To the
extent that this tranquilizer should not be used as a punitive be-
havior modification device, the first guideline of Pena is consistent
with the Wyatt standards.3 5 However, the other guidelines estab-
lished in Pena were new. The second guideline stated that a boy
given thorazine shall be examined for possible adverse side effects
within thirty minutes. 36 Third, the boy should be given the option
of taking thorazine orally or by injection because injection has
more dangerous physical and psychological effects.3 7 These guide-
lines seem to be concerned with establishing policies to protect the
patient's health, rather than to advance any clear constitutional in-
terests.
C. The Four Constitutional Interests
Four constitutional interests were alluded to in Scott v.
Plante.38 Scott, who had been committed to New Jersey's Trenton
State Hospital on a finding that he was insane when he allegedly
murdered his grandmother, complained that he had been confined
in violation of several constitutional rights. In response to Scott's
involuntary medication claim, the court upheld his cause of ac-
tion.39 The court first based its decision upon Scott's first amend-
ment right to autonomy of mental processes.40 Second, in a non-
emergency situation, Scott had due process rights to notice and a
hearing prior to the administration of medication.41 It was relevant
that Scott was never adjudged incompetent nor incapable of giving
33. Id. at 211.
34. Id.
35. See notes 22-23 & accompanying text supra. Although it is not entirely clear
under what circumstances drug use will be allowed, Pena expressly excludes
punitive use of tranquilizers. The court said Goshen's administrator's would
be allowed flexibility in establishing regulations subject to the courts guide-
lines and the future protection of the court if such flexibility was abused. 419
F. Supp. at 207-08.
36. 419 F. Supp. at 207-08.
37. Id. The court further noted that at trial, an expert testified that in a similar
institutional environment, eight out of ten children who were given the
choice between oral and hypodermic administration of drugs chose the for-
mer despite their disturbed state of mind at the time. Id.
38. 532 F.2d 939 (3d Cir. 1976).
39. Id. at 946-47. Reference was made to Mackey v. Procunier, 477 F.2d 877 (9th
Cir. 1973), although Mackey was not explicitly based on the first amendment.
See note 27 supra.
40. 532 F.2d at 946.
41. Id.
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informed consent 42 which is similar to Winter,43 although due pro-
cess was not a ground used in that earlier case. Third, following
Knecht,44 the court recognized the issue of eighth amendment
cruel and unusual punishment. Finally, the court noted the possi-
bility that Scott's right to bodily privacy may be a valid ground to
challenge the forced administration of medication.45
The four constitutional grounds against forced medication-
freedom of mental processes, due process, cruel and unusual pun-
ishment, and a right to privacy-were dealt with more thoroughly
in Rennie v. Klein.46 A mental patient involuntarily confined in
Ancora Psychiatric Hospital (a state institution) had been diag-
nosed as a paranoid schizophrenic who exhibited suicidal and
homicidal behavior.47 When Rennie became more homicidal and
his general condition deteriorated, the attending psychiatrist ob-
tained permission from the state attorney general to administer
medication without his consent in order to prevent him "from
harming other patients, staff and himself and to ameliorate his de-
lusional thinking pattern."48 The drug prolixin was chosen as the
only drug which was both injectable and long-lasting. Although he
had many side effects from the drug,49 Rennie's overall condition
and behavior improved markedly. Rennie brought action under
section 198350 to enjoin the defendant psychiatrists and officials
from forcibly administering the psychotropic drugs5 ' in the ab-
sence of an emergency situation.
42. Id.
43. Winters v. Miller, 446 F.2d 65 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 985 (1971). See
notes 13-17 & accompanying text supra.
44. Knecht v. Gillman, 488 F.2d 1136 (8th Cir. 1973). See notes 25-29 & accompany-
ing text supra.
45. Scott v. Plante, 532 F.2d 939, 946-47 (3d Cir. 1976). But see Souder v. McGuire,
423 F. Supp. 830, 832 (M.D. Penn. 1976). The Souder court allowed an action
against unconsented treatment with psychotropic drugs which have a painful
or frightening effect, and based that decision both on cruel and unusual pun-
ishnent doctrine and on right to privacy grounds.
46. 462 F. Supp. 1131 (D.N.J. 1978). The facts presented here are found at 1135,
1138-30. See also Note, Rennie v. Klein: Constitutional Right of Privacy Pro-
tects a Mental Patient's Refusal of Psychotropic Medication, 57 N.C. L REv.
1481 (1979).
47. 462 F. Supp. at 1135. At one point in a series of releases and readmissions,
Rennie had'been readmitted for threatening to kill President Ford. Id.
48. Id. at 1139.
49. Short-term side effects from the use of psychotropic drugs commonly include
"blurred vision, dry mouth and throat, constipation or diarrhea, palpitations,
skin rashes, low blood pressure, faintness and fatigue." Id. at 1138.
50. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
51. The Rennie court acknowledged the extensive use of psychotropic drugs: "In
sum, psychotropic drugs are widely accepted in present psychiatric prac-
tice.... They are the treatment of choice for schizophrenics today." 462 F.
Supp. at 1137. See also A. BROOKS, LAw, PSYCHATRY AND THE MENTAL
[Vol. 60:363
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The Rennie court discussed the four recognized constitutional
grounds at some length. First, no eighth amendment cruel and un-
usual punishment was found.5 2 The court distinguished Knecht
because the drug apomorphine had no proven therapeutic value;
its use was not recognized standard medical practice; and the ad-
verse effects of its use appeared unnecessarily harsh.5 3 The court
then distinguished Nelson v. Heynes,5 4 Pena v. New York State Di-
vision of Youth,5 5 and Maskey v. Procunier5 6 because in those
cases drugs were used improperly and for punishment rather than
as part of an ongoing treatment program.5 7 In Rennie, however,
psychotropic drugs are recognized as effective; the side effects
were not unnecessarily harsh in light of long term benefits; and the
drugs were used in an ongoing treatment program at Ancora and
not as punishment.58
Second, the Rennie court found that there was no first amend-
ment interference with the right to free mental processes. The
court held that "if forced medication is otherwise proper, the tem-
porary dulling of the senses accompanying it does not give rise to
the level of the first amendment violations found in Kaimowitz."5 9
The court also held that the right to refuse treatment,60 a com-
HEALTH SYsTEM 878 (1974); Plotkin, Limiting the Therapeutic Orgy: Mental
Patients' Right to Refuse Treatment, 72 Nw. U. L. RE V. 461, 474 (1974).
52. 462 F. Supp. at 1143.
53. Id.
54. 491 F.2d 352 (7th Cir.) cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974). See note 18 & accompa-
nying text supra.
55. 419 F. Supp. 203 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). See text accompanying notes 31-37 supra.
56. 477 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1973). See note 27 supra.
57. 462 F. Supp. at 1143.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 1144. In Kaimowitz v. Dep't of Mental Health, Civ. No. 73-19434-AW (Cir.
Ct. Wayne County, Mich., fled July 10, 1973), reprinted in THE FEDERAL ROLE,
supra note 2, at 510, and A. BROOKS, supra note 40, at 902, the first amend-
ment rose to a much greater level of importance because the adverse effects
of experimental psychosurgery on a patient would be irreversible and un-
predictible. Effects included flattened emotional responses, lack of abstract
reasoning ability, loss of capacity for new learning, general sedation and apa-
thy, and impairment of memory. Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health,
reprinted in FEDERAL ROLE, supra note 2, at 515, and A. BROOKS, supra note
40, at 909.
In Rennie, it was significant to the court that Rennie had indicated his
desire to be cured of his condition. 462 F. Supp. at 1144. But there is no ques-
tion of Rennie's lack of a free volition in selecting the method of cure. Still,
that desire to be cured must have appeared to the court to be a form of im-
plied consent to the temporary dulling of the senses.
60. For background on a patient's right to refuse treatment, see Plothin, supra
note 51, at 461. For an appendix that gives a fairly recent state statutory sur-
vey of the rights of mental patients to refuse treatment, see id. at 504-25. See
also Comment, The Right Against Treatment: Behavior Modification and the
Involuntarily Committed, 23 CATH. U. TL REV. 774 (1974); Comment, Advances
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ponent of the right to privacy, extends to mental patients in non-
emergency situations. However, the court stated that Ancora had
a duty to prevent danger to other patients and staff, and, as a re-
sult, Rennie "cannot both refuse his medication and be left free to
inflict harm on others."61 Finally, the court found that because
Rennie had been provided extended hearings, he had received am-
ple due process protection. 62 However, the court emphasized that
should a drug program subject a patient to harsh side effects and
possible permanent disability, the patient is entitled to a hearing
with legal counsel and an outside psychiatrist. 63 If the patient can-
not afford the consultants, the state must supply them.64
Although the Rennie court did not issue an injunction against
the involuntary administration of protixin because its use had
been terminated, it did list four factors that must be considered in
determining whether injunctions should be issued in the future:65
"(1) plaintiff's physical threat to patients and staff at the institu-
tion, (2) plaintiff's capacity to decide on his particular treatment,
(3) whether any less restrictive treatments exist, and (4) the risk
of permanent side effects from the proposed treatment."66
When Rennie was expanded into a class action,67 the court then
concluded that voluntary as well as involuntary patients at mental
institutions have privacy rights, including the right to refuse treat-
ments.68 The court reasoned that the intrusiveness and long-term
side effects of forced medication are sufficient grounds for recogni-
tion of the privacy right bar, regardless of the fact that the patient's
commitment was voluntary.69 However, these privacy rights were
qualified by the court's four factors.70
There are a number of problems with the Rennie court's four
factors for determining the propriety of forced medication on
mental patients. First, a court should also consider the patient's
physical threat to property and, even more so, to himself. Al-
though there is much to be said for a person's control over his
in Mental Healtk" A Case for the Right to Refuse Treatment, 48 TEMP. L.Q. 354
(1975).
61. 462 F. Supp. at 1145.
62. Id. at 1147.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1147-48.
65. Id. at 1148. The court also denied an injunction against the use of thorazine,
which had been administered to Rennie involuntarily when his condition
worsened. Id.
66. Id. at 1148.
67. Rennie's motion to enlarge his suit to a class was granted March 20, 1978.
Rennie v. Klein, 476 F. Supp. 1294, 1297 (D.N.J. 1979).
68. Id. at 1307.
69. Id. at 1297, 1307.
70. Id. at 1308.
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body, a mental patient often does not have knowing control over
himself. Even if he does have knowing control, the state has an
interest in protecting the patient from injuring himself, especially
because the institution often must bear the costs of any self-in-
flicted injuries, whether permanent or otherwise. Second, if a pa-
tient is incapable of making treatment decisions, a court should
consider the preferences of the patient's family or guardian. Third,
no standards were given for what consideration or use of treat-
ment forms which are less restrictive than drugs. In an emergency
situation, medication may well be the less restrictive treatment, al-
though in a non-emergency situation, it may be that other forms of
behavior modification, such as room isolation, would be far less re-
strictive than drugs. Finally, although the risk of permanent side
effects from drug treatment should be considered, a court should
be cautioned not to limit itself to one source of medical informa-
tion, especially in a day when medical knowledge advances at re-
markable rates.
D. A Private Right of Action
While the original Pena decision was concerned with the rights
of an involuntary mental patient, Naughton v. Bevilacqua7l dealt
with a private right of action for a patient voluntarily committed at
the Rhode Island Institute of Mental Health. Timothy Naughton
had been diagnosed as moderately retarded and afflicted with
childhood schizophrenia, and tranquilizers were used at times to
control his behavior. Although the Institute was informed that
Timothy reacted negatively to tranquilizers of the phenothiazine
family, from the time of his admission, Timothy had been treated
with phenothiazines which sometimes caused him serious adverse
reactions such as convulsive spasms and hemorrhaging.72 A com-
plaint for injunctive relief and damages was filed against the Direc-
tor of the Institute, the administering physician, and the State of
Rhode Island.
The Naughton court held that a cause of action had been stated
under the Developmentally Disable Assistance and Bill of Rights
Act, which gives disabled or retarded persons a "right to appropri-
ate treatment, services and habilitation." 73 It was also decided
that the Act was applicable when the drugs were given to Timothy,
with knowledge of its harmful effects, solely for the purpose of con-
trolling his behavior and without any habilitative effect.74 Section
71. 458 F. Supp. 610 (D.R.L 1978), aff'd, 605 F.2d 586 (1st Cir. 1979).
72. 458 F. Supp. at 613-14.
73. Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 6010(1) (1975).
74. 458 F. Supp. at 614.
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1983 was found to be an appropriate vehicle with which to redress
such a violation of civil rights. In addition, the Naughton court also
held that violations of this statutory right can be remedied through
a private cause of action.75 The legislative scheme and history was
invoked to support this discovery of a private cause of action under
section 1983 as well as the discovery of an implied cause of action.
The court reasoned that a statutory remedy which addresses only
the wrongs of an institution and ignores individual wrongs would
be inconsistent with the Congress's principle desire which was to
correct past neglect of individual rights. 76 However, this reasoning
differs from the conclusions reached by the Fifth Circuit in Wyatt
v. Aderholt,77 which held that individual remedies (such as habeas
corpus, medical malpractice, and tort actions) would not support
state hospital residents' actions to establish institutional programs
for developing and implementing individual treatment plans.78
75. Id. at 614-16.
76. Id. at 616-17.
77. 503 F.2d 1305, 1316 (5th Cir. 1974).
78. The court in Wyatt presented four reasons for its finding that individual suits
by mental patients were inappropriate: (1) mental patients are likely to be
unaware of their legal rights; (2) mental patients are likely to have limited
access to legal help; (3) private suits may be costly and protracted thus deter-
ring individual patients from bringing such actions; (4) private suits may pro-
duce distortions in therapeutic effects in that "a staff may tend to give
especially good-or especially harsh-treatment to patients the staff expects
or knows to be litigious." Id. at 1316. These reasons are dubious because
mental patients, like children, can always have family members, guardians,
or legal advisors periodically check their treatment through conversations
with the patients or by examining progress reports. Also, the denial of indi-
vidual suits does not square well with patients' right to individualized treat-
ment.
An involuntarily-confined mental patient's constitutional right to treat-
ment was found in O'Connor v. Donaldson, 493 F.2d 507, 520-21 (5th Cir. 1974),
vacated and remanded on other grounds, 422 U.S. 563 (1975). The Supreme
Court in O'Connor did not reach the constitutionality of a right to treatment,
holding only that "a State cannot constitutionally confine without more a
nondangerous individual who is capable of surviving safely in freedom by
himself or with the help of willing and responsible family members or
friends." 422 U.S. at 576. Other cases upholding a mental patient's constitu-
tional right to individualized treatment are: New York State Ass'n for Re-
tarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 393 F. Supp. 715 (E.D.N.Y. 1975); Davis v.
Witkins, 384 F. Supp. 1196 (N.D. Ohio 1974); Welsh v. Likens, 373 F. Supp. 487
(D. Minn. 1974), affd, 550 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1977); New York State Ass'n for
Retarded Children, Inc. v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752 (E.D.N.Y. 1973); Wyatt
v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala.), 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972),
affld sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974). The class ac-
tion in Wyatt was initially brought as one lawsuit. However, the District
Court gave two formal opinions making a distinction between patients receiv-
ing treatment for mental illness (first citation) and patients receiving treat-
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E. Emergency v. Non-Emergency Situations
A distinction between emergency and non-emergency situa-
tions was discussed in Rogers v. Okin,79 a class action which chal-
lenged medication and seclusion policies at Boston State Hospital,
a state institution for both voluntarily and involuntarily committed
mentally ill patients. The staff used forced medication and invol-
untary seclusion in non-emergency situations, and had given un-
consenting patients mind-altering psychotropic drugs which were
known to cause adverse physical and neurological side effects. 80
The court held that a mental patient could be forcibly drugged in
emergency situations where failure to do so would result in a sub-
stantial likelihood of harm to others.8 1 However, in non-emergency
situations both voluntary and involuntary mental patients pos-
sessed the right to refuse medication.82 This right to refuse was
based on the right to privacy in bodily integrity and on the first
amendment right to control of the mind.83 In dismissing the state's
interest in forcible injections, the court stated what may be consid-
ered the central philosophy behind the recent federal cases:
The only purpose, therefore, of forced medication, in a non-emergency, is
to help the patient. The desire to help the patient is a laudable if not noble
goal. But, a basic premise of the right to privacy is the freedom to decide
whether we want to be helped, or whether we want to be left alone. It
takes a grave set of circumstances to abrogate that right. That a non-
emergency injection in the buttocks may be therapeutic does not consti-
tute such a circumstance.
8 4
This recent line of federal cases85 thus consistently has upheld
the proposition that the non-emergency use of drugs in non-emer-
gency situations for the purpose of control or for punishment,
rather than as part of an ongoing psychotherapeutic purposes, may
violate the eighth amendment prohibition against cruel and unu-
sual punishment, first amendment freedom of thought, due pro-
cess rights, and the constitutional right to privacy. Furthermore,
as the Naughton case indicates, private rights of action based on
statutory provisions, may be available to remedy these constitu-
ment for mental retardation (second citation). With limited exceptions, the
District Court treats both classifications in a similiar manner.
The right to individualized treatment plans may also be conferred statuto-
rily. See, e.g., NEB. REv. STAT. § 83-1044 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
79. 478 F. Supp. 1342, 1352 (D. Mass. 1979).
80. Id. at 1359-60.
81. Id. at 1365-68.
82. Id. at 1367-68.
83. Id. See also notes 156-59 & accompanying text infra.
84. 478 U.S. at 1369.
85. For two recent state cases following the federal courts' lead in situations of
forced medication, see In re K.B., 609 P.2d 747, 750-51 (Okla. 1980); In re
Boyd, 403 A.2d 744, 752 (D.C. 1979).
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tional violations. 6 The bottom line is that the involuntary admin-
istration of drugs is likely to be prohibited as a behavior
modification contingency, at least where that contingency is pun-
ishment. The central theme in the drug cases is that the forced
administration of drugs for punishment is too intrusive on bodily
and mental integrity in the absence of an emergency. A different
situation, one which has not been addressed by the courts, is
where drugs are administered as reinforcements or rewards for
positive behavior. Conceivably, a court might well find that drugs
producing mild pleasant sensations have a legitimate place in the
realm of therapy. A drug can hardly be intrusive where it is wel-
comed.
III. SECLUSION
One of the more common behavior modification devices is se-
clusion. Seclusion, also known as "time out," is a temporary re-
moval of a person from positive reinforcement after the person has
engaged in unacceptable behavior. Although this device can con-
sist of merely separating the person from social interaction (such
as the old grade school sanction of standing in a corner), seclusion
may also involve placing the person in an isolated room for a pe-
riod of time.87
In the prison setting, such an isolated room or "seclusion room"
might consist of a stark darkened cell with no sanitary facilities
other than a floor toilet. It has been held that prisoner's confine-
ment in such a cell for five days constitutes cruel and unusual pun-
ishment where the offense is relatively minor, such as possession
of a rope made from towels.8 8 Enforced isolation and boredom
have been considered permissible disciplinary measures, although
they might not remain so if utilized for an extended period of
time.8 9
86. Several states have recently enacted statutes regulating the institutional use
of medication on mentally retarded or mentally ill persons. See ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 59-1415 (Supp. 1979); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5325.1(c) (Deering
1979); COLO. REV. STAT. § 27-10.5-114(5) (Supp. 1979); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 17-206d(c), -206e(b) (West Supp. 1980); GA. CODE ANN. § 88-2503.5 (Supp.
1980); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2928(6) (1976); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-171p
(West Supp. 1980); McH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 330.1718 (1975); MONT. REV.
CODES ANN. § 38-1319 (Supp. 1977); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-24-2d(1) (West
Supp. 1980-81); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 51-61(h) (West Supp. 1980-81).
87. See G. MARTM & J. PEAR, supra note 2, at 183.
88. La Reau v. MacDougal, 473 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 878
(1973).
89. 473 F.2d at 978. The court's conception in La Reau apparently was that prison
punishment in a seculsion room must not be grossly disproportionate to the
offense in order to comply with eighth amendment standards. See Weems v.
United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910); Rummel v. Estelle, 568 F.2d 1193, 1195
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A stronger stand has been taken against the use of seclusion
rooms, in boy's training schools. The isolation of juveniles in cold,
dark cells containing only a toilet and a mattress has been held to
be cruel and unusual punishment9 0 because the placement of
juveniles in solitary confinement "may be psychologically damag-
ing, anti-rehabilitative, and, at times inhumane."9 1 In another case
involving juvenile inmates, standards were set for the use of "dor-
mitory confinement," defined as the placing of an inmate alone in a
secured room in his dormitory.92 The standards indicated that
"time out" procedures may not be employed unless confinement is
necessary to prevent harm to the inmate or others, to prevent the
destruction of property, to prevent escape, or to restrain substan-
tial disruptive behavior.9 3
Seclusion standards for mental patients were set out in detail in
Wyatt v. Stickney. 94 The standards indicated that: (1) a mentally
ill patient usually may not be placed in isolation unless in an emer-
gency to prevent harm to himself or others, and a professional's
written order explaining the reasons for isolation are required if
there is no emergency; (2) emergency use of isolation is limited to
a maximum of one hour, and the written order for non-emergency
use is effectve for twenty-four hours; (3) while in emergency isola-
tion, the patient must have his physical and psychological condi-
tion checked and charted each hour by qualified ward personnel;
(4) the patient must have access to a restroom every hour and
must be bathed every twelve hours.95
(5th Cir. 1978), affd, 445 U.S. 213 (1980); Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 577-79
(8th Cir. 1968); Willoughby v. Phend, 301 F. Supp. 644, 646 (N.D. Ind. 1969);
Holt v. Sarver, 300 F. Supp. 825, 827 (E.D. Ark. 1969).
90. Inmates of Boys' Training School v. Affleck, 346 F. Supp. 1354, 1366-67 (D.R.L
1972).
91. Id. at 1372. Due to insufficient testimony on the distinction between segrega-
tion and solitary confinement and on when destructiveness occurs, the court
in Affleck denied a preliminary injunction. However, the court did formulate
minimum standards for the future use of seclusion, including requirements
that juveniles each receive a room with sufficient reading light, sufficient
clothing, bedding changes, and personal hygiene supplies. Id. at 1373.
92. Morales v. Turman, 364 F. Supp. 166, 177 (E.D. Tex. 1973).
93. Id. at 177-78. Additionally, dormitory confinement is not to last longer than
fifty minutes. Id.
94. 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972), 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aO"d sub
nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
95. 344 F. Supp. at 380. As to mentally ill patients, the court extended these same
standards to physical restraints. With respect to mentally retarded patients,
the Wyatt court responded:
Seclusion, defined as the placement of a resident alone in a locked
room, shall not be employed. Legitimate "time out" procedures may
be utilized under close and direct professional supervision as a tech-
nique in behavior-shaping programs.
344 F. Supp. at 400. Since the court made a curious distinction between seclu-
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The more recent line of cases dealing with seclusion tend to re-
fine and clarify the standards governing its use. The greater em-
phasis is placed on the procedural due process rights of the
subject. Pena v. New York State Division of Youth96 concerned, in
part, eighth and fourteenth amendment challenges to the use of
isolation as a means of controlling the excited behavior of boys at
Goshen Annex in New York. Although Goshen's own regulations
prohibit room confinement as a means of punishment,9 7 the staff
often used hours of room confinement as punishment for dis-
obeying staff instructions, failing to cooperate, or exhibiting a neg-
ative attitude. The court granted injunctive relief against using
isolation as punishment.98 In situations where isolation is used to
prevent violent and threatening behavior, the court held that "ex-
cept in the most extreme circumstances, no boy should be held in
isolation for more than six hours, and the condition of isolated
boys should be evaluated at least hourly by a visit from a staff
member."99 It appears that this six hour limitation on emergency
isolation allows more flexibility than the one hour maximum im-
posed in Wyatt. The frequent evaluation visits should be sufficient
to protect the subject's health.
In Gary W. v. Louisiana,0 0 standards very similar to the Wyatt
standards'O' were imposed on state institutions for mentally re-
tarded, physically handicapped, and delinquent children. Al-
though seclusion in a locked room was prohibited, legitimate "time
out" procedures were found permissible. 0 2 Clarifying Wyatt, the
court defined "time out" as including placement in an unlocked
room where a staff member remains constantly nearby to super-
vise the child.103 The standards differ from the Wyatt standards in
that the period of non-emergency isolation is not to exceed twelve
hours as opposed to twenty-four hours, and that bathroom facili-
ties are to be available to the child "as needed" rather than once
every hour.1 04
sion and "time out," it must be concluded that "time out" may not involve the
use of a locked isolated room and that it is limited to either moving the re-
tarded pateint a short distance away or temporarily withdrawing social rein-
forcement.
96. 419 F. Supp. 203 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
97. Room confinement was permitted only "where a child constitutes a serious
and evident danger to himself or others." Id. at 210.
98. Id. at 210-11.
99. Id.
100. 437 F. Supp. 1209 (E.D. La. 1976).
101. See note 95 & accompanying text supra.
102. 437 F. Supp. at 1229.
103. Id.
104. Id. For a similar set of standards, see Evans v. Washington, 459 F. Supp. 483,
488 (D.D.C. 1978).
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Due process considerations in connection with seclusion were
recognized in Eckerhart v. Hensley, 0 5 in which treatment and con-
ditions at Fulton State Hospital in Missouri were challenged by a
class of involuntarily confined mental patients. In settling any
doubts about the scope of seclusion practices covered by Wyatt,
the court defined seclusion as "a means of restricting a patient by
removing him from social contact and placing him in a locked
room." 1 0 6 Although Fulton's policy prohibited the use of seclusion
for disciplinary purposes, in practice it had been used for such in-
fractions as fighting, mouthing off, walking off the ward, and refus-
ing to mop up spilled coffee.' 0 7 The court held that if Fulton should
ever promulgate a new policy whereby seclusion is used as a form
of discipline rather than for answering "a medical decision to se-
clude for some therapeutic purpose,"108 then the institution must
provide the minimum due process required by the Supreme Court
in Wolff v. McDonnell.109 These requirements included: (1)" a writ-
ten notice of the infraction prior to a hearing; (2) a written state-
ment containing reasons for the disciplinary action; and (3) an
opportunity to call witnesses and to present evidence on his own
behalf.110
Analogous to the use of seclusion rooms in mental institutions
and juvenile training schools is the use of cramped, solitary con-
finement cells as punishment for adult prisoners.-" Recently, in
Hutto v. Finney,112 the Supreme Court upheld a district court or-
der' 3 setting a maximum limit of thirty days on the punitive use of
solitary confinement in the Arkansas penal system. Although it ac-
knowledged that confinement in an isolation cell is a form of pun-
ishment subject to eighth amendment scrutiny, the Court agreed
105. 475 F. Supp. 908 (D. Mo. 1979).
106. Id. at 926. At Fulton, a patient would be secluded in a ward sleeping room
which usually contained only a bed. The patient could wear no clothes ex-
cept underwear. Id.
107. Id. at 927-28 & 928 n.67.
108. Id. at 928 (emphasis in original).
109. 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
110. Id. at 563-72. See also Davis v. Balson, 461 F. Supp. 842, 878 (D. Ohio 1978) (in
addition to these requirements, it recognized a mental patient's right to
assistance from another resident or staff member if he is illiterate or the
charges are complicated).
111. A prisoner's solitary confinement in a small, unlighted "Behavior Adjustment
Unit" was not cruel and unusual punishment per se, even when the confine-
ment was not administered as punishment for any specific conduct. But such
use of a "Behavior Adjustment Unit" for administrative control purposes may
be unconstitutional if confinement therein is excessively restrictive. Hoss v.
Cuyler, 452 F. Supp. 256, 283-85 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
112. 437 U.S. 678 (1978).
113. Finney v. Hutto, 410 F. Supp. 251, 278 (E.D. Ark. 1976), aOrd, 437 U.S. 678
(1978).
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with the district court that punitive isolation "is not necessarily
unconstitutional, but it may be, depending on the duration of the
confinement and the conditions thereof."114 The district court
found three conditions which constituted cruel and unusual pun-
ishment, and thus required a thirty day limit on the use of solitary
confinement. The violative conditions included the practice of
placing three or more inmates in an extremely small cell;" 5 the
practice of placing confined inmates on an unappetizing diet of
"grue";. 6 and the policy of indeterminate sentencing to the isola-
tion cells.117
The thirty day limitation for solitary confinement in Hutto ap-
parently applies only for confinement for punitive purposes and
not for administrative purposes, such as segregating maximum se-
curity inmates who cannot be placed safely with the general prison
population. Nebraska has made a similar distinction, statutorily,
in its regulation of solitary confinement in prisons:
No person in the adult division shall be placed in solitary confinement for
disciplinary reasons for more than fifteen consecutive days, or more than
thirty days out of any forty-five day period, except in cases of violence or
attempted violence committed against another person or property when
an additional period of isolation for disciplinary purposes is approved by
the warden. This provision shall not apply to segregation or isolation of
persons for purposes of institutional control.1 1 8
The Nebraska statute applies a higher standard of control over the
punitive use of solitary confinement in prisons. Besides the
shorter time limitation, the use of consecutive confinement pre-
sumably is limited in order to prevent abuse of accumulating pun-
ishments. This is an important consideration which the Hutto
court failed to address.
When a state statute is the contolling standard for the use of
seclusion or isolation in the mental institution setting, a question
114. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 685 (1978), quoting Finney v. Hutto, 410 F. Supp.
at 275.
115. Obviously, when several violent inmates are placed together in very cramped
quarters, the punitive effect is even greater than that of solitary confinement.
For instance, in Hutto, the inmates literally had to fight over the bunk with
the mattress. In any event, mattresses were removed during the day. Finney
v. Hutto 410 F. Supp. at 276. It is difficult to imagine how these conditions
could ever serve to reform the behavior of the inmates.
116. 437 U.S. 678, 686-87 (1978).
117. The commissioner of corrections was of the view that the maximum limit in
solitary confinement should be 14 days. But the permissible period was ex-
tended by the district court to 30 days in light of its order to correct condi-
tions as follows: no more than two inmates were to be placed in isolation
cells in the absence of an emergency; the use of "grue" as food in the prison
was to be eliminated; and the policy of indeterminate sentencing was to be
abolished. Id. at 277-78.
118. NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-4,114 (Reissue 1976) (emphasis added).
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may arise as to whether the statute is applicable in a given factual
situation. This issue was recently confronted in Rogers v. Okin,]"9
wherein mental patients charged that seclusion was being used in
non-emergency situations for the purposes of treatment and pun-
ishment.120 This was contrary to a Massachusetts statute which
permitted seclusion to be used only in emergencies where there is
an occurrence of, or a "serious threat of extreme violence, personal
injury, or attempted suicide."12 In the Austin Unit of the Boston
State Hospital, the staff routinely used seclusion as a negative re-
inforcement 122 to modify patient behavior which they felt was un-
desirable, and the May Unit of the hospital followed a similar
policy. 123 The records of both units revealed that seclusion was be-
ing employed as a behavior modification device.124 The defendants
conceded that the Massachusetts statute was controlling, but con-
tended that their practices were permissible because seclusion
protected the "private interests" of the patients by preventing
them from going "out of control." 25
The court was not persuaded by this view and found that seclu-
119. 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979).
120. Id. at 1371. See also Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 446 F.
Supp. 1295, 1306-07, 1328 (E.D. Pa. 1977), modified, 451 F. Supp. 233 (E.D. Pa.
1978), (seclusion was prohibited in a state institution when used for the con-
venience of an insufficiently sized staff).
121. MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 123, § 21 (Michie/Law Co-op. Supp. 1980). Several other
states have recently enacted statutes generally allowing the use of seclusion
only in emergencies to protect the mental patient or others from harm. ARiz.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-513 (Supp. 1980-81); Aim. STAT. ANN. § 59-1415 (Supp.
1979-80); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5325.1(c) (Deering 1979); COLO. REv.
STAT. § 27-10.5-114(5) (Supp. 1979); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-206e(a) (West
Supp. 1980); GA. CODE ANN. § 88-2503.5 (Supp. 1980); ILT ANN. STAT. ch. 91 1/2,
§ 2-109 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-14-1.6-6 (Burns Supp.
1979); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2928 (1976); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 202A180(10),
202B.060(10) (Baldwin Cum. Supp. 1979); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28:171E (West
Supp. 1980); MIcH. Comp. LAwS ANN. § 330.1742 (1975); MONT. REV. CODES
ANN. § 38-1320 (Supp. 1977); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-24.2d(3) (West Supp. 1980-
81); S.C. CODE § 44-23-1020 (1976); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 27A-12-6, 27B-8-
5 (1976); TENN. CODE ANN. § 33-307 (Supp. 1980); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 51.61(i)
(West Supp. 1980-81). Cf. NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-1066 (Reissue 1976) (patient
has right to refuse treatment unless it is necessary to prevent injury to him-
self or others, or if it will substantially improve his or her mental health).
122. For the purposes of this comment, negative reinforcement is another term for
punishment. See A. BANDURA, supra note 2, at 295.
123. 478 F. Supp. at 1373-74.
124. The behavior sought to be modified could not have reasonably constituted "a
serious threat of extreme violence, personal injury, or attempted suicide"
under the Massachusetts statute. For instance, patients in the May Unit were
placed in seclusion for such infractions as engaging in sexual relations, refus-
ing to take medication, walking nude in the day hall, refusing to stop talking
loudly, and saying negative things about oneself. Id. at 1373-74.
125. Id. at 1374-75.
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sion was being used routinely for treatment and not for emergency
restraint.126 The court granted injunctive relief to the plaintiffs
under the Massachusetts statute. 12 7 The court then considered the
constitutional issue in order to deal with plaintiffs' section 1983
claim for damages and held that the defendants had violated the
patients' due process "liberty interest" under the fourteenth
amendment.128
Recent federal court cases and state statutes clearly follow the
lead of the principles formulated in Wyatt. Generally, the use of
seclusion rooms in institutional settings is limited to emergency
conditions in which seclusion is needed to prevent serious harm to
the subject or to others. Constitutional safeguards in the form of
procedural standards operate to protect the basic human rights of
the subject where seclusion rooms are being used. While these
standards may vary according to the jurisdiction, a central notion
running throughout is that seclusion rooms are highly restrictive
and, if used at all, they must be the least restrictive means129 avail-
able to control subject behavior. On the other hand, mild "time
out" techniques, such as ignoring the individual or directing him to
another part of the room upon an exhibition of negative behavior,
are not being regulated with as much severity as seclusion rooms.
This type of "time out" is much less restrictive in terms of time and
place, although it remains an effective means for modifying under-
sirable behavior in certain instances. 3 0 But where the individual
who is subject to treatment exhibits criminal or highly destructive
behavior, such "time out" devices may be too weak as a punish-
ment to be of any value. In such instances seclusion rooms may be
recognized as a proper behavior modification contingency.
IV. PHYSICAL RESTRAINTS
A behavior modification device similar to seclusion is the use of
physical restraints as a contingency for unacceptable behavior.
Physical restraints are generally thought to be mechanical devices,
such as straps or chains, which bind the limbs of a person thereby
rendering him immobile. Although physical restraints are argua-
bly more effective in controlling unacceptable behavior than seclu-
126. Id. at 1374.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. at 379, 334 F. Supp. at 396. See generally Hoff-
man & Foust, Least Restrictive Treatment of the Mentally Ill: A Doctrine in
Search of Its Senses, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1100 (1977).
130. See, e.g., Clark, Rowbury, Baer & Baer, Timeout as a Punishing Stimulus in
Continuous and Intermittent Schedules, 6 J. APPLIED BEHAVIORAL ANALYSIS
443 (1973).
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sion, a critical evaluation would reveal that their use is less
desirable legally because a person's freedom of movement is more
severely restricted. As the following cases illustrate, the courts
have rigorously scrutinized the use of physical restraints as a be-
havior modification device. As such, the courts have provided
greater protections of personal and constitutional rights to those
individuals confronted by institutional use of physical restraints.
In Landman v. Royster,13 ' the use of chains and handcuffs in a
prisoner's cell was held to constitute a form of corporal punish-
ment that is "constitutionally excessive" under the eighth amend-
ment. 3 2 Because seclusion could be used to prevent a dangerous
prisoner from harming persons and property, the court ruled that
the use of such physical restraints is justified only when necessary
to protect the prisoner from harming himself. 3 3 Even this use is
not permissible until less restrictive means of control have been
attempted. The court suggested that drug treatment or straitjack-
ets are preferable alternatives. 3 4
In the context of mental patients, it has also been held35 that
the fourteenth and eighth amendments proscribe the use of cer-
tain physical restraints for controlling behavior unless less restric-
tive means of control have failed.136 The Wyatt 3 7 standards for
mentally ill patients were exactly the same for physical restraints
as for seclusion.138 With respect to mentally retarded patients, the
Wyatt standards indicated that physical restraints may be used
131. 333 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Va. 1971).
132. Id. at 647.
133. Id. at 648. The court noted with irony the fact that permanent scars, lack of
sleep, and prolonged physical pain were the results of the use of restraints in
the case before it. Id. at 647-48.
134. Id. See also Lollis v. New York State Dep't of Social Serv., 322 F. Supp. 473,
484 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (unnecessary or prolonged handcuffing or binding of feet
might violate constitutional rights, but such restraints might be used for a
short period upon a showing of a reasonable necessity for such action).
135. Welsch v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487, 503 (D. Minn. 1974), affd in part and va-
cated in part, 550 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1977). The Welsch court noted that two
justifications have been advanced for the use of physical restraints: self-pro-
tection of the patients and insufficient staffing. But state law may provide
that the right to treatment requires a "qualified staff in sufficient numbers."
Rone v. Fireman, 473 F. Supp. 92, 122 (N.D. Ohio 1979). Thus, it is possible
that insufficient staffing may not justify the use of restraints in the treatment
of mental patients.
136. See also Wheeler v. Glass, 473 F.2d 983, 984, 987 (7th Cir. 1973), which held
that binding two mentally retarded youths to their beds in spread-eagle fash-
ion for 77% hours for allegedly engaging in a consensual homosexual act was
cruel and unusual punishment under the eighth amendment. This was a case
which clearly shocked the conscience.
137. Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373, 380 (M.D. Ala. 1972), affid sub nom. Wyatt
v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
138. See notes 71-72 & accompanying text supra.
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only when absolutely necessary to prevent the patient from harm-
ing himself or others. Furthermore, physical restraints may be
used only if they are the least restrictive means to accomplish
their intended purpose. However, such purposes shall never in-
clude punishment, staff convenience, or a treatment substitute.13 9
The Wyatt case has spawned a recent trend of federal court de-
cisions which place strict limitations on the use of physical re-
straints, usually because of the supposed dehumanizing and anti-
therapeutic effects upon persons. The factual situations probably
weighed heavily in the courts' reformation of institutional usage of
physical restraints. For example, in Pena v. New York Division for
Youth,140 physical restraints were often used on the children in
the Goshen Annex for Boys for punishment, although the institu-
tion's regulations permitted physical restraints only where the
child is uncontrollable and poses a serious danger to himself or
others.141 Children at the Goshen Annex had been bound with
handcuffs and plastic straps for hours at a time. Often they were
restrained with a device which connected their hands and feet to-
gether behind their backs and then left lying face down on the
floor. Similarly, inmates were also bound to their beds.142 The
Pena court declared that the use of physical restraints at Goshen
violated the eighth and fourteenth amendments and enjoined the
defendants to follow their own regulations.14 3 Additionally, the
court ordered that physical restraints could not be used for more
than thirty minutes (except for vehicular transportation of a dan-
gerous individual), that hands and feet could never be tied to-
gether, and that an individual should never be bound to a bed or
any other piece of furniture.144
It is interesting to note that the Pena court placed a maximum
thirty minute limitation on the use of physical restraints, while in
Wyatt, an order could be effective for up to twelve hours in the
case of mentally retarded patients and up to twenty-four hours for
139. 344 F. Supp. at 401. The Wyatt standards further indicate that a qualified pro-
fessional may order the use of physical restraints on a mentally retarded pa-
tient, but only for a period of 12 hours and only if the patient is examined
every half hour. The restraints must not cause physical injury, and discom-
fort must be minimized. The patient must have an opportunity for motion
and exercise for at least 10 minutes for every two hours of physical restraints.
Id. This last standard is a bit puzzling: physical restraints can be used only
if absolutely necessary to prevent harm to the patient or others, then it would
seem logical that the patient probably should not be taken off the restraints
until he or she poses no further likelihood of harm.
140. 419 F. Supp. 203 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
141. Id. at 210.
142. Id. at 211.
143. Id. at 210-11.
144. Id. at 211.
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mentally ill patients in non-emergency situations. It is unclear
why juvenile offenders should have greater protection from physi-
cal restraints than mental patients, who are less culpable for their
behavior and, therefore, less able to understand the reasons for
and circumstances of their restraint. In addition, mental patients
may also be juveniles, which creates a problem in reconciling and
applying the Wyatt and Pena standards.
The Wyatt145 physical restraints standards for the mentally re-
tarded were followed in Gary W. v. Louisiana,146 and were ex-
tended to institutionalized children who are mentally retarded,
emotionally disturbed, physically handicapped, socially delin-
quent, or normal but abandoned. Like Wyatt, the court in Gary W.
ordered that a child "shall be restrained only if alternative tech-
niques have failed and only if such restraint imposes the least pos-
sible restriction consistent with its purpose."' 47
In Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hospital,4 8 a class
action against Pennhurst, a Pennsylvania institution for the men-
tally retarded, physical restraints were claimed to be justified by
staff shortages. An extreme example was the case of an extremely
self-destructive female Pennhurst resident who was placed in a
physical restraint device for 651 hours in June, 1976, for 720 hours
in August, for 674 hours in September, and for 647 hours in Octo-
ber. However, when occupational therapy was applied, the patient
responded successfully, and became able to function without re-
straints for as much as four hours a day.149 The court found that
physical restraints can be harmful to the patients' bodies, noting
specifically the case of one child who was strangled to death when
tied to a chair in soft restraints 5 0 The court ordered Pennhurst to
employ physical restraints only as a part of an individual treat-
145. Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. at 401.
146. 437 F. Supp. 1209, 1213, 1229 (E.D. La. 1976).
147. Id. at 1229. As with most other techniques of behavior modification, physical
restraints are subject to the "least restrictive alternative" doctrine. That doc-
trine states that "when government does have a legitimate communal goal to
serve, it should act through means that curtail human freedom to no greater
extent that is essential for securing the goal.' D. Chambers, Right to the
Least Restrictive Alternative Settingfor Treatment, in 2 LEGAL RIGHTs OF THE
MENTALLY HANDICAPPED 991, 993 (B. Ennis & P. Friedman eds. 1973). The
least restrictive alternative doctrine only recently has been extended to the
mental health field. See, e.g., Covington v. Harris, 419 F.2d 617, 623-25 (D.C.
Cir. 1969); Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657, 661 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Wyatt v.
Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373, 379, (M.D. Ala.), 344 F. Supp. 387, 396 (M.D. Ala.
1972), affd sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974). See gen-
erally Hoffman & Foust, supra note 130.
148. 446 F. Supp. 1295 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
149. Id. at 1307.
150. Id. at 1307 n.36.
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ment plan, and "only when necessary to (1) prevent injury to self
or others, or (2) promote normative body positioning and physical
functioning."'U5 Thus, contrary to earlier cases, the Halderman
court was willing to permit the use of physical restraints in non-
emergency settings where there is a medical determination of
their necessity.152
Similarly, the court in Evans v. Washington153 ordered that
physical restraints could be used only when necessary to prevent
injuries to the patient or others. Furthermore, the court stated ex-
plicitly that restraints could not be used for the convenience of the
institution's staff.15 4 This stricter set of restrictions on physical re-
straints if the prevailing view, at least as evidenced by recently en-
acted state statutes.155 In most instances, therefore, the use of
physical restraints as punishment or as a behavior modification
contingency will be forbidden by law.
There remains, however, the problem of enforcement of the
law. As a practical matter, the protection afforded an incompetent,
institutionalized individual is lost without the intervention of a
conscious and zealous third party. A patient, bound hand and foot,
is in no condition to bring his situation before a court of law. This
is especially true of an insane or mentally retarded patient who is
unlikely to know that his rights are being violated. For this reason,
a relative, guardian, or other responsible person with no connec-
151. Id. at 1328.
152. See also Eckerhart v. Hensley, 475 F. Supp. 908, 927 (W.D. Mo. 1979), where
the court held that the medical decision to use physical restraints and seclu-
sions was proper under due process considerations only where there is suffi-
cient documentation of the patient behavior to justify the use of physical
restraints or seclusion.
153. 459 F. Supp. 483 (D.D.C. 1978).
154. Id. at 488.
155. See ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-513 (Supp. 1980-81); ARYN STAT. ANN. § 59-1415
(Supp. 1979); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5325.1(c) (Deering 1979); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 27-10,5-114(7) (Supp. 1979); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17-206e(a) (West
Supp. 1980); GA. CODE ANN. § 88-2503.5 (Supp. 1980); IDAHO CODE § 66-345
(Supp. 1979), ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 91 1/2, § 2-108 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980); IND.
CODE ANN. § 16-14-1.6-6 (Burns Supp. 1979); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2928 (1976);
Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 202A.180(10), 202B.060(10) (Baldwin Cum. Supp. 1979);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28:171D (West Supp. 1980); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34,
§ 2332-A (Supp. 1980-81); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 123, § 21 (Michie/Law Co-op.
Supp. 1980); MICH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 330.1740 (1975); MmN. STAT. ANN.
§ 253A.17 (West 1971); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 38-1320 (Supp. 1979); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 83-356 (Cum. Supp. 1980); NEV. REV. STAT. § 433.484(7) (1975);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-24.2d(3) (West Supp. 1980-81); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW
§ 33.04 (McKinney 1978); OP& REV. STAT. §§ 426.385(3), 427.031(4) (Supp. 1979);
S.C. CODE § 44-23-1020 (1976); S.D. CODIFIED LAwS ANN. §§ 27A-12-6, 27B-8-5
(1976); TENN. CODE ANN. § 33-307 (Supp. 1980); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 7704
(1968); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 5161(i) (West Supp. 1980-81); WYO. STAT. § 25-71
(1967).
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tion to the institution should be required to periodically make
unannounced checks on a patient's condition. Only such scrutiny
can give meaning to the prohibition against using physical re-
straints as punishment.
V. TOKEN ECONOMIES AND THERAPEUTIC LABOR
A. Token Economies
Positive reinforcement (rewards) as a contingency to increase
"good" behavior or decrease "bad" behavior is probably the least
adversive behavior modification technique currently in use.15 6
Positive reinforcement may be either primary or secondary. A pri-
mary reinforcer fulfills biological needs such as food, water, sex, or
relief from pain. Secondary reinforcers, such as verbal praise, a
pat on the back, gold stars or money,157 are effective as a behavior
changing reward because of its past assoication with primary rein-
forcers. Secondary reinforcers may be "tokens" which can be used
to purchase primary reinforcers, such as candy or stockings.158
The use of "token economies" in institutional settings can be very
effective in shaping behavior.
Token economies have three defining characteristics. First, in-
stitutional authorities, using their value judgments, must desig-
nate desirable behaviors in which persons should engage. Second,
there must be tokens, or mediums of exchange which persons re-
ceive then they engage in the desirable behaviors. 5 9 Third, there
must be available those primary reinforcers that the persons want
and which can be received in exchange for the token earned.160
The first formalized use of a token economy scheme in the Fed-
eral Bureau of Prisons began in 1965 when the CASE (Contingen-
cies Applicable to Special Education) project was effectuated at
the National Training School for Boys in Washington, D.C. CASE
was a project designed to motivate delinquent youth to attend
school. School attendance was encouraged by giving teenagers
secondary reinforcers (called "cash") for achievement in school
programs. The "cash" could be used to buy snacks or clothing or to
participate in special game activities such as ping pong and pool.
156. THE FEDERAL ROLE, supra note 2, at 16.
157. Whitman, Behavior Modification: Introduction and Implications, 24 DEPAUL
L. REV. 949, 955 (1975).
158. Wexler, Token and Taboo: Behavior Modification, Token Economies, and the
Law, 61 CAUaF. L. REV. 81, 83 (1973).
159. Tokens may be tangible or intangible and may include such things as metallic
coins, poker chips, green stamps, or recorded points.
160. Milan & McKee, Behavior Modification: Principles and Application in Cor-
rections (Oct. 1973), reprinted in THE FEDERAL RoLE, supra note 2, at 459, 474-
75.
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The use of the token economy in the CASE project was considered
"very successful both in increasing the amount of time the offend-
ers spend in school and the amount of knowledge they gained."' 61
In an institution, such as an adolescent treatment center, it is
easier to modify undesirable behavior with a token economy be-
cause the artificial environment is normally much less confortable
than the outside living environment. Because basic privileges are
so limited, there is a stronger motivation in an institution to earn a
higher number of privileges. For example, in a token economy pro-
gram funded by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration
(LEAA), adolescent subjects, by accumulating points for engaging
in cooperative and desirable behavior, could earn extra privileges,
which included any of the following: (1) five cigarettes a day; (2)
regular meals; (3) a bed; (4) state clothes; (5) one or two hours of
daily recreation; and (6) the privilege of participation in the pro-
gram at all. But if a subject is uncooperative and exhibits undesir-
able behavior, he or she would be placed at a more coercive
privilege level wherein the subject might have to: (1) sleep on a
mattress on the floor; (2) wear night clothing only; (3) eat nutri-
tious but unappetizing meals; (4) do boring tasks or calisthenics to
receive reinforcement; (5) use the phone only in an emergency;
and (6) communicate only with the staff.'6 2
A due process question arises where institutionalized subjects
begin a token economy program at a level of privileges less than
that for the general institution population. In other words, can an
artificial treatment environment be created by taking away basic
privileges? The question was answered negatively in Clonce v.
Richardson 163 which dealt with challenges to the START program
at the Medical Center for Federal Prisoners at Springfield, Mis-
souri. START (Special Treatment and Rehabilitative Training)
was a program to modify the behavior of certain highly aggressive
and assaultive inmates. Several privilege levels were established
and as an inmate learned to better control his aggressive behavior,
he could obtain more privileges. When the inmate could com-
pletely control his behavior he was returned to the regular prison
environment. The START program succeeded for ten of the
nineteen inmates who were involuntarily transferred to the pro-
gram, which was thought to be a good success rate considering the
161. Behavior Modification Programs in the Federal Bureau of Prisons: Oversight
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administra-
tion of Justice of the House Comm. of the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 4
(1974) (testimony of Norman Carlson, Director, Federal Bureau of Prisons,
Dep't of Justice) [hereinafter cited as 1974 Oversight Hearing].
162. TuE FEDERAL RoLE, supra note 2, at 16-17, 358-71.
163. 379 F. Supp. 338 (W.D. Mo. 1974).
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criminal backgrounds and extreme prison conduct of the in-
mates.l6
In Clonce, the plaintiff inmates claimed that the beginning pro-
gram level, where they were stripped of the most basic rights and
privileges, was a form of cruel and unusual punishment. The in-
mates further alleged that the entire program deprived them of
freedom of religion, freedom of expression, freedom from unwar-
ranted search and seizure, and freedom from invasion of pri-
vacy.165 The parties stipulated that START inmates were not
allowed to attend religious services, or to acquire political and edu-
cational literature. In addition, they were subjected to constant
surveillance, which included both body searches and cell searches.
Finally, the inmates were housed in small, dimly lit cells. The
court did not reach these claims since the Federal Bureau of Pris-
ons discontinued the program, thereby rendering these issues
moot.166 However, Clonce did establish that if an inmate is trans-
ferred to a behavior modification program like START which in-
volves a sufficient change in confinement conditions, then the
inmate is entitled to the due process guarantees of notice, hearing,
and an opportunity to challenge his inclusion in the program.167
Because the benign nature of token economies as a means of
effecting behavior modification, the courts have said little with re-
spect to the constitutional limitations on this form of treatment.
Even in light of Clonce, if due process rights are protected, a little
common sense may be all that is needed to forego constitutional
scrutiny. So long as drastric privilege deprivations are not em-
ployed at the beginning program level or during the program, none
of the problems recognized in Clonce need ever materialize.168
B. Therapeutic Labor
Within the institutional framework, token economies are often
employed so that inmates or patients will learn to adequately per-
164. 1974 Oversight Hearing, supra note 161, at 5-7. The START program was
eventually terminated due to the small number of inmates who met the rigid
criteria for the program and due to the disproportionate amount of manpower
and resources necessary to keep the program in operation. Id.
165. 379 F. Supp. at 352.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 347-48, 352.
168. In Wexler, supra note 158, at 107-08, the author concluded that such drastic
deprivations may soon subject token economy systems to "legal and behavior
extinction." This prediction has not manifested itself in reality, and token
economies appear to be a settled and permissive area in the law. For more on
the techniques of the token economy, see T. AYILON & N. AzRiN, THE TOKEN
ECONoMy: A MOTrVATIONAL SYSTEM FOR THERAPY AND REHABILIrATION
(1968).
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form institutional work assignments.169 Job assignments them-
selves can be therapeutic by reducing apathy and alienation in an
institution.170 However, a problem can arise if an involuntarily
committed patient is forced to perform institutional work assign-
ments that have no therapeutic purpose and which are given solely
to save labor costs for the institution. One court has held that the
Constitution will not tolerate such a situation on the basis of the
thirteenth amendment prohibition of involuntary servitude.171
The question of where to draw the line between therapautic
and nontherapeutic labor was taken up in Wyatt v. Stickney,172
where the Wyatt court took an absolutist approach and forbade all
involuntary patient maintenance work assignments, whether ther-
apeutic or not. 7 3 However, the court did allow voluntary patient
maintenance work, regardless of any therapeutic value, where pa-
tients receive minimum wage compensation under the Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA).174 In addition, Wyatt also permitted cer-
tain therapeutic labor, such as requiring a patient to make his own
bed, so long as the labor does not involve operation and mainte-
nance of the institution.17 Wyatt made no mention of the involun-
tary servitude rationale. Instead, the decision was presumably
based on the rationale that uncompensated work is dehumanizing
and a violation of the patient's right to treatment. 7 6
Shortly after Wyatt, a suit was filed in Souder v. Brennan 177 to
test the applicability of the FLSA to patient-workers in state facili-
ties for the mentally ill and mentally retarded. In a far-reaching
decision, the Souder court held that such patient-workers were
considered "employees" within the meaning of the FLSA, even if
the work they do is therapeutic, so long as the institution receives
some consequential economic benefit.178
169. THE FEDERAL ROLE, supra note 2, at 378.
170. Id.
171. Jobson v. Henne, 355 F.2d 129, 132 n.3 (2d Cir. 1966). The court also stated that
a patient can be required to participate in work assignments where they pro-
vide some therapeutic purpose. Without a therapeutic purpose, however,
mere payment of compensation for forced labor will not remove work assign-
ments from the thirteenth amendment prohibition. Id. at 132.
172. 344 F. Supp. 373, 381 (M.D. Ala.), 344 F. Supp. 387, 402-03 (M.D. Ala. 1972), affd
sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
173. 344 F. Supp. at 381; 344 F. Supp. at 402-03.
174. 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1976 & Supp. 1I 1979).
175. 344 F. Supp. at 381; 344 F. Supp. at 402.
176. 344 F. Supp. at 375.
177. 367 F. Supp. 808 (D.D.C. 1973).
178. Id. at 812-13. By requiring state institutions to pay the federal minimum wage
even for therapeutic patient labor, Souder has caused some states to abolish
all or nearly all work programs which would require compensation. See Per-
lin, The Right to Voluntary, Compensated, Therapeutic Work as Part of the
Right to Treatment: A New Theory in the Aftermath of Souder, 7 SETON HALL
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The effect of Souder was substantially limited by Davis v. Bal-
son,17 9 wherein inmates at the Lima State Hospital argued that the
fourteenth amendment was violated by the failure to pay the fed-
eral minimum wage to all patients who perform work at the hospi-
tal. At one point, 305 inmates worked an average of four to eight
hours per day in jobs necessary for proper administration of the
hospital, and were paid an average of only ten to fifteen dollars per
month. Work assignments were not necessarily based on thera-
peutic considerations and were generally assigned to serve admin-
strative convenence. 8 0
The Davis court did not address the federal minimum wage ar-
gument because it did not recognize Souder as a controlling au-
thority. In explaining its position, the court stated that since the
time Souder decided that patient workers were "employees" under
the FLSA, the Supreme Court had invalidated those amendments
to the FLSA which had extended the wage provisions to virtually
all state employees.' 8 ' Since this removed the underlying basis for
applying the FLSA to patient "employees" of state mental institu-
tions, the Davis court found no statutory right to compensation for
patient labor.182 The court did, however, recognize a constitutional
right to adequate compensation based on the constitutional right
to treatment.183
The court in Davis held that forced work assignments consid-
ered by professionals in the field to be countertherapeutic are vio-
lative of a patient's right to treatment. 8 4 Therefore, certain
standards were required to ensure that a patient's right to treat-
ment was honored. 8 5 These standards included that: (1) no com-
L. REV. 298, 300 & n.15 (1976). The author argues that termination of work
programs in state mental institutions violates a patient's right to treatment,
right to the least restrictive treatment, right to freedom from harm, and right
to earn a livelihood. See id. passim.
179. 461 F. Supp. 842 (N.D. Ohio 1978).
180. Id. at 850-51.
181. Id. at 851. See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 852 (1976).
182. 461 F. Supp. at 851.
183. Id. at 851-52. See New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children., Inc. v. Carey,
393 F. Supp. 715 (E.D.N.Y. 1975); Davis v. Watkins, 384 F. Supp. 1196 (N.D.
Ohio 1974); Welsh v. Likens, 373 F. Supp. 487 (D. Minn. 1974), af'd, 550 F.2d
1122 (8th Cir. 1977); New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Rock-
efeller, 357 F. Supp. 752 (E.D.N.Y. 1973); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373
(M.D. Ala.), 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd sub nom. Wyatt v.
Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
184. 461 F. Supp. at 852.
185. Id. The Davis court seemed very persuaded by the expert testimony of Dr.
Walter Fox, M.D., who stated that forcing persons to perform menial tasks
can damage their self-image. Dr. Fox also stated that "paying people for the
value of work they do" is an "extremely important component in developing a
positive attitude toward one's job." Id. at 852.
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pensation need be given for requiring a patient to perform tasks of
a personal housekeeping nature; (2) all work assignments must be
based upon an individual patient's treatment needs and not upon
the institution's maintenance needs; (3) all work assignments
must be approved as a therapeutic activity by a qualified mental
health professional responsible for the patient's treatment; (4) all
work assignments must be supervised by a qualified staff member;
(5) compensation must be given for all work assignments for
which the institution would otherwise have to pay an employee;
and (6) the patient wage rate shall be the amount that an ordinary
employee would receive for performing the work, adjusted down-
ward only if the patient's disability hinders performance.186
The labor standards developed in Davis appear to be more
carefully conceived and more flexible than the Wyatt standards.
Aside from the constituitonal, rather than statutory, ground for ad-
equate wage reinforcement, an essential difference is that Davis
permits even involuntary maintenance work by institutionalized
patients so long as a therapeutic purpose is involved. This change
from the absolute prohibition of involuntary maintenance work in
Wyatt is beneficial both to the patient who can gain self-esteem
from the treatment measure, and to the institution which can re-
ceive any services the patient is able to deliver, with wages ad-
justed according to ability. These practical and humanitarian
considerations make the Davis standards a better guide for state
regulation of therapeutic labor in institutions.187 The chief effect of
Davis is to greatly extend the use of therapeutic labor as a con-
structive behaviour modification device.
VI. PSYCHOSURGERY AND ELECTRIC SHOCK
A. Psychosurgery
Psychosurgery and electric shock are the two most extreme and
controversial means to achieve behavior change in persons. Psy-
chosurgery may be defined as the surgical removal or destruction
of brain tissue or the cutting of brain tissue to disconnect one lobe
of the brain from the other "with the primary intent of altering be-
186. Id. at 852-53. The court noted that because these standards were based on a
patient's right to treatment, they were applicable to civilly as well as crimi-
nally committed persons. Id. at 853.
187. Recent statutes regulating patient labor include: KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2929(5)
(1976); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 38-1318 (Supp. 1977); NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-
1066(7) (Reissue 1976); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAw § 33.04 (McKinney 1978); OHio
REv. CODE ANN. §§ 5122.28, 5123.87 (Supp. 1979-80); OR. REV. STAT.
§§ 426.385(1) (j), 427.031(1) (i) (Supp. 1979); S.C. CODE § 44-23-1060 (1976); WIs.
STAT. ANN. § 51.61(b) (West Supp. 1980-81).
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havior, thought, or mood."188 Although not a behavior modification
technique in the sense of a contingently administered stimulus
seeking a desired response under learning theory principles, 8 9
psychosurgery is often aligned with other behavior modification
techniques because the result of its use-a change in behavior-is
the same. An essential difference is that psychosurgery can
change behavior permanently and unpredictably.
Psychosurgery as a medical-surgical procedure' 9 0 is unsettled,
and it likewise exists in an unsettled, legal environment, although
the argument has been advanced that regulation can stabilize the
legal environment.' 9 ' There is a dearth of case law concerning the
constitutional limits of psychosurgery. Surprisingly, the landmark
decision in this area is an unreported opinion, Kaimowitz v. De-
partment of Mental Health,192 which is recognized as the principal
judicial pronouncement on experimental psychosurgery. 93
In Kaimowitz, a civilly committed sexual psychopath had given
initial written consent to submit to a state-funded medical experi-
ment. The planned experiment was to compare the effects of the
drug cyproterone acetate with psychosurgical destruction of a por-
tion of the brain. The goal of the experiment was to determine
which technique is more effective in controlling aggression in insti-
188. Psychosurgery Report of the National Institute of Mental Health (Jan. 21,
1974), reprinted in THE FEDERAL RoLE, supra note 2, at 142.
189. See notes 2-7 & accompanying text supra.
190. Not long ago, a panel of scientific, clinical, legal, and ethical experts convened
to study the current practice of psychosurgery. The panel recommended the
following- "Psychosurgery should be regarded as an experimental therapy at
the present time-As such, it should not be considered to be a form of therapy
which can be made generally available to the public because of the peculiar
nature of the procedure and of the problems with which it deals." Psychosur-
gery Report of the National Institute of Mental Health (Jan. 21, 1974), re-
printed in THE FEDERAL ROLE, supra note 2, at 144.
191. Peters & Lee, Psychosurgery, A Case for Regulation, 1978 DET. C.L. REV. 383,
410.
192. Civ. No. 73-19434-AW (Cir. Ct. Wayne County, Mich. filed July 10, 1973), re-
printed in THE FEDERAL ROLE, supra note 2, at 510, and A. BROOKS, supra
note 51, at 902. See also Note, Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health.- A
Right to Be Free from Experimental Psychosurgery?, 54 B.U. L REv. 301
(1974).
193. See also Aden v. Younger, 57 Cal. App. 3d 662, 129 Cal. Rptr. 535 (1976), which
involved challenges to amendments to a California statute concerning the
regulation of psychosurgery and electric shock treatment. The court held,
inter alia, that the amendments were unconstitutionally vague since the only
prerequisite for treatment was that treatment must be critically needed for
the welfare of the patient. Id. at 677-78, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 545. The court also
held that the failure to provide for adequate notice of a hearing was a denial
of procedural due process. Id. at 684-86, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 549-50. For a brief
discussion of the other issues in Aden, see Comment, Psychosurgery: The
Rights of Patients, 23 Loy. I. REv. 1007, 1012-14 (1977).
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tutionalized males.194 A third party challenged the validity of the
experiment and the court held that an involuntarily committed
mental patient does not have the legal capacity to give informed
consent to destructive experimental psychosurgery.195 The ele-
ments of informed consent-competency, knowledge, and volunta-
riness-cannot be ascertained with sufficient reliability to
safeguard a patient's interest from such an invasive procedure as
psychosurgery. Of the three elements of informed consent, the
court gave the most attention to voluntariness. With respect to in-
stitutionalized persons, the court stated:
Involuntarily confined mental patients live in an inherently coercive in-
stitutional environment. Indirect and subtle psychological coercion has a
profound effect upon the patient population. Involuntarily confined pa-
tients cannot reason as equals with the doctors and administrators over
whether they should undergo psychosurgery. They are not able to volun-
tarily give informed consent because of the inherent inequality of their
position. 19 6
It is interesting to note that the court specifically held that an in-
voluntarily detained mental patient could give informed consent to
accepted neurosurgical procedures, the implication being that psy-
chosurgery was not yet an accepted neurosurgical procedure.197
The Kaimowitz court drew further support for its decision from
the first amendment right of citizens to control their own "minds,
thoughts, and expressions,"' 98 and the right of privacy in bodily
194. Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health, reprinted in THE FEDERAL ROLE,
supra note 2, at 510-11, and A. BROOKS, supra note 51, at 902-03.
195. Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health, reprinted in THE FEDERAL ROLE,
supra note 2, at 517-20, and A. BROOKS, supra note 51, at 903. The three ele-
ments required for informed consent in Kaimowitz are briefly explained in
Barnhart, Pinkerton & Roth, Informed Consent to Organic Behavior Control,
17 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 39 (1977):
(1) knowledge-the adequacy of the information conveyed to the
prospective treatment subject and his or her comprehension of this
information;
(2) volition-the circumstances allowing for freedom of choice; and
(3) competency-the capacity to make rational or intelligent judg-
ments.
Id. at 51 (footnotes omitted).
196. Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health, reprinted in THE FEDERAL ROLE,
supra note 2, at 519-20, and A. BROOKS, supra note 51, at 915.
197. Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health, reprinted in THE FEDERAL ROLE,
supra note 68, at 523, and A. BROOKS, supra note 51, at 918. It appears that
the court's decision was heavily influenced by the irreversible and intrusive
effects of experimental psychosurgery. The court found that psychosurgery
often leads "to the blunting of emotions, the deadening of memory, the reduc-
tion of affect, and limits the ability to generate new ideas." Kaimowitz v. De-
partment of Mental Health, reprinted in THE FEDERAL ROLE, supra note 2, at
522, and A. BROOKS, supra note 51, at 917.
198. Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health, reprinted in THE FEDERAL ROLE,
supra note 2, at 522, and A. BROOKS, supra note 51, at 917. The court agreed
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and mental functions.199 With respect to the asserted right of pri-
vacy in bodily functions, there is clear support from the Supreme
Court.200 From the recognition of bodily privacy, it follows that
mental functions, such as thought, behavior, personality and iden-
tity, which lie at the core of one's individuality, are equally deserv-
ing of the protection afforded by the right of privacy.201
Federal involvement in the area of psychosurgery resulted in
the passage of the National Research Service Award Act of 1974202
which created the National Commission for the Protection of
Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research. The
commission was required to study the practice of psychosurgery in
the United States and to make recommendations to the Secretary
of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare of policies for
the continued use of psychosurgery.203 In 1977, the Commission
issued its report204 which reviewed the history of psychosur-
gery.205 The report surveyed relevant issues, case law, and appli-
cable legislation.20 6 As a result of the Commission's studies and
hearings,2 07 eight recommendations were formulated by the Com-
mission 20 8 on the use of psychosurgery.
The Commission's first four recommendations set out the basic
requisites to psychosurgeries. 2 09 The final four recommendations
that the law must provide "[p]rotection of the individual's right to freedom of
expression against interference by the government in its efforts to achieve
other social objectives or to advance its own interests." Kaimowitz v. Depart-
ment of Mental Health, reprinted in THE FEDERAL ROLE, supra note 2, at 521,
and A. BROOKS, supra note 51, at 916-17 (quoting Emerson, Toward A Gen-
eral Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE LJ. 877, 895 (1963)). The court
found no compelling state interest sufficient to override the patient's first
amendment interest in mental processes.
199. Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health, reprinted in THE FEDERAL ROLE,
supra note 2, at 522-23, and A. BROOKS, supra note 51, at 919-20.
200. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (a woman's right to bodily privacy
permits her decision to terminate pregnancy in its early stages); Stanley v.
Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (right to view obscenity in the home); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (right of privacy prohibits laws against dis-
semination of contraceptives).
201. See Note, Conditioning and Other Technologies Used to "Treat?" "Rehabili-
tate?" "Demolish?" Prisoners and Mental Patients, 45 S. CAL. L REv. 616, 663
(1972).
202. 42 U.S.C. § 2891-1 (1974).
203. Id.
204. 42 Fed. Reg. 26318 (1977).
205. Id. at 26319-20.
206. Id. at 26320-23.
207. Id. at 26323-29.
208. Id. at 26329-32.
209. (1) That any psychosurgery proceedure should be performed only
at an institution with an institutional review board (IRB) and only
after such IRB has determined that (a) the surgeon is competent in
the procedure, (b) the procedure is appropriate for the particular pa-
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
merely set out certain HEW follow-up procedures. 2 1 0 In summa-
rizing its report, the commission stated:
This report recommends the [sic ] psychosurgery be used only to meet
the health needs of individual patients, and then only under strict limita-
tions and controls, with added safeguard where the patient is a prisoner,
minor, or in a mental institution.
2 11
Although the Commission's report is not law, it does conclude that
the Kaimowitz approach might not apply today. New information
in the field indicates that psychosurgery can be "less hazardous
than previously thought and potentially of significant therapeutic
value."21 2 The Commission looked with favor upon Oregon's com-
prehensive legislation for the regulation of psychosurgery.2 13 The
Oregon model requires committee review of both the merits of the
therapy and informed consent, permits psychosurgery on involun-
tarily committed patients, and recognizes guardian or proxy con-
sent to psychosurgery of an incapacitated patient.2 14
tient, (c) adequate pre- and post operative evaluations will be per-
formed; and (d) the patient has given informed consent.
Id. at 26329-30. In (2), (3) and (4) the commission incorporates the require-
ments of recommendation (1) and imposes further conditions for the per-
formance of psychosurgery on specific populations of patients whose
capacity for self-determination may be limited by institutionalization, mental
disability, involuntary confinement or immaturity. For specific provisions,
see id. at 26330-31.
210. (5) Material concerning the nature, extent and outcomes of
psychosurgical procedures should be compiled. Stringent pro-
visions for the safeguard of privacy must be included as well.
(6) The secretary is encouraged to conduct studies and evaluate
the safety and efficacy of specific procedures in relieving spe-
cific psychiatric symptoms and disorders.
(7) The secretary should impose strict sanctions, including the
withholding of federal funds to insure compliance with the reg-
ulations implementing these recommendations.
(8) Congress should take appropriate action to assure implementa-
tion of regulations and to assure psychosurgery is not con-
ducted or supported by Federal agencies unless such agencies
are primarily concerned with health care or the conduct of bi-
omedical and behavorial research.
Id. at 26331-32.
211. Id. at 26318.
212. Id. at 26323.
213. OR. REv. STAT. §§ 426.700 to .760 (Supp. 1979).
214. Id. In addition, it must appear that these conditions are met before the re-
view board can deem a psychosurgery (or lobotomy) operation appropriate
in a given case:
(a) All conventional therapies have been attempted;
(b) The criteria for selection of the patient have been met-
(c) The operation offers hope of saving life, reestablishing health or
alleviating suffering; and
(d) All other viable alternative methods of treatment have been
tried and have failed to produce satisfactory results.
O. REV. STAT. § 426.720(3) (Supp. 1979). Compare this statute with psycho-
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Because the Commission's report suggests that certain kinds of
psychosurgery may be becoming medically acceptable as a treat-
ment for extreme cases of behavior disorders, more regulation of
the procedure will probably occur.215 Like the relatively complete
Oregon model, the statutes should make it clear that psychosur-
gery should not be used except as a last resort necessary to protect
the patient's health and then only with adequate informed con-
sent. Because of its extreme intrusiveness on the body and the
mind, some legislators may well advocate that psychosurgery not
be used as treatment in any circumstances. Certainly, because of
the potential permanent adverse effects, such as those alluded to
in Kaimowtz,216 state lawmakers should consider all legal as well
as ethical components of psychosurgery.217 For instance, one
question that must be asked is whether it is morally permissible
for a psychosurgeon to invade the cavity of the mind and alter it as
a dentist would fill a tooth. Direct tinkering with the brain is an
invasion of the last bastion of human autonomy. If the sovereign is
permitted to make such invasions, albeit in extreme cases, then
nothing humans possess is sacred.
B. Electric Shock
Another extreme method used to change problem behavior in
persons is the contingent application of electric shocks. Electric
shock treatment, which is to be distinguished from electroconvul-
sive therapy,2 18 can be a very adversive form of punishment, de-
surgery regulation in other states. See Amr. STAT. ANN. § 59-1415 (Supp.
1979); CA. WELF. & INsT. CODE §§ 5325(g), 5326.95 (Deering 1979); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 17-206d(d) (West Supp. 1980); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 458.325 (West
Supp. 1980); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 91 1/2, § 2-110 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 59-2929(6) (1976); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 202A.180(7),
202B.060(7) (Baldwin Cum. Supp. 1979); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28:171 0 (West
Supp. 1980); MAss. CONN. LAws ch. 123, § 23 (Michie/Law. Co-op. Supp. 1980);
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 38-1322 (Supp. 1977); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-24.2d(2)
(West Supp. 1980-81); Omo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 5122.27.1(6), 5123.86(6) (Page
Supp. 1979); S.C. CODE § 44-23-1010 (1976); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 51.61(k) (West
Supp. 1980-81).
215. See generally Peters & Lee, Psycwhsurgery: A Case for Regulation, 1978 DET.
CL. REV. 383.
216. See notes 59 & 197 supra.
217. See generally Greenblatt, The Ethics and Legality of Psychosurgery, 22 N.Y.J
ScH. L. REv. 961 (1977).
218. Electroconvulsive therapy, which is not technically within the scope of be-
havior modification, is a method of inducing an epileptic-like seizure under
the theory that it will reintegrate "the split personality of a schizophrenic."
R. MARTIN, LEGAL CHALLENGES TO BEHAVIOR MODIFMATION 145 (1975). Elec-
troconvulsive therapy can also be used to treat severe depression in a patient.
Note, Regulation of Electroconvulsive Therapy, 75 MIc. L REv. 363, 363
(1976).
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pending of course upon the duration and intensity of the shock.
Because of its potential for abuse, one would suspect that ade-
quate safeguards for its use would have been formulated either ju-
dicially or legislatively. However, with the exception of a few state
statutes,2 1 9 the law on the subject is sparse.
The Wyatt 2 2 0 minimum constitutional standards for adequate
rehabilitation of mentally retarded persons continue to prevail as
the governing judicial authority in the area. The standards indi-
cate that electric shock devices "shall only be used in extraordi-
nary circumstances to prevent self-mutilation leading to repeated
and possibly permanent physical damage to the resident and only
after alternative techniques have failed."221 The standards also re-
quire the patient's informed consent to treatment, and a commit-
tee's review and professional supervision of the treatment. 222
Perhaps the main deficiency in the Wyatt standards for electric
shock treatment is that there are no provisions for the maximum
voltage allowed or the maximum time for which a shock can be
administered. Although shocks are usually brief and low-level, 223
any regulation governing their application for behavior modifica-
tion purposes should set a point beyond which individual rights
are clearly implicated.
VII. CONCLUSION
In foreseeing the future of behavior modification, one could
paint a gloomy picture indeed. One might imagine an Orwellian
nightmare where the sovereign need only to apply carefully con-
trolled psychological principles to shape the citizenry into a con-
forming, obedient, and unthinking society. Day-to-day conduct
would be determined by a prepared program so that there would
219. Several states have recently enacted statutes regulating the use of electric
shock treatment or electroconvulsive therapy. See Aax. STAT. ANN. § 59-1415
(Supp. 1979); CAT. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 5325(g), 5326 to 5326.95 (Deering
1979); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-206d(d) (West Supp. 1980); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 458.325 (West Supp. 1980; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 91 1/2, § 2-110 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1980); IowA CODE ANN. § 229.23 (West Supp. 1980-81); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 59-2929(6) (1976); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 202A.180(7), 212B.060(7) (Baldwin
Cum. Supp. 1979); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28:171F (West Supp. 1980); MAss.
ANN. LAWS ch. 123, § 23 (Michie/Law. Co-op. Supp. 1980); MICH. COMP. LAws
ANN. § 330.1716 (1975); MO. REV. STAT. § 202.213 (1978); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-
24.2d(2) (West Supp. 1980-81); OHo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 5122.27.1(2), 5123.86(2)
(Page Supp. 1979); O. REV. STAT. § 426.385(2) (Supp. 1979); S.C. CODE § 44-23-
1010 (1976); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 51.61(k) (West Supp. 1980-81).
220. Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972), affd sub nom Wyatt v.
Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
221. 344 F. Supp. at 400-01.
222. Id. at 400-01.
223. Budd & Baer, supra note 9, at 217.
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no longer be even an illusion of free will or free thought. Although
this chilling scene is not impossible, a more likely prediction is
that behavior modification principles will be responsibly used by
profesionals possessing sound ethical standards. It is true that
even the most ethical professional has periodic lapses in judgment.
It is therefore necessary for the sovereign to recognize and vigor-
ously protect the individual rights of the citizenry. The sovereign
then would not control human behavior, but control the control-
lers.
To ensure the sound evolution of behavior modification, the law
concerning the various techniques should be standardized. The
law has reached the point where there are clear trends, especially
as to the constitutional rights of patients in mental institutions, but
a sense of uniformity is lacking. Now is the best time for a national
committee to reinvestigate the use of behavior modification in light
of recent legal developments. Such a committee should thor-
oughly examine the ethical issues. It should consider the legal is-
sues and draw from the best of the federal case law and state
statutes to create a model act which would guarantee rights to all
individuals, not just institutionalized persons.
The Wyatt standards have provided a good starting point for an
analysis of the issues; yet, because of the volatile state of the art,
the law needs to be refined, particularly in the areas of procedural
due process and right of privacy where there is still considerable
uncertainty. The day is near when behavior modification tech-
niques such as those discussed herein may unexpectedly confront
each and every one of us in the educational, commercial, and even
home settings. If we are to preserve the integrity of the mental
processes, then it is essential that we act now to gather the pieces
of the law of behavior modification and construct a stronger for-
tress against potentially abusive treatment.
Michael T. Brogan '81
